<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE rfc SYSTEM "rfc2629.dtd">
<?rfc toc="yes"?>

<rfc ipr="full2026" docName="draft-richardson-ipsec-opportunistic-10.txt">

<front>
  <area>Security</area>
  <workgroup>Independent submission</workgroup>
  <title abbrev="opportunistic">
     Opportunistic Encryption using The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
  </title>

  <author initials="M." surname="Richardson" fullname="Michael C. Richardson">
    <organization abbrev="SSW">Sandelman Software Works</organization>
    <address>
      <postal>   
        <street>470 Dawson Avenue</street>
        <city>Ottawa</city>
        <region>ON</region>
        <code>K1Z 5V7</code>
        <country>CA</country>
      </postal>
      <email>mcr@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca</email>
      <uri>http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/</uri>
    </address>
  </author>

  <author initials="D.H." surname="Redelmeier"
          fullname="D. Hugh Redelmeier">
    <organization abbrev="Mimosa">Mimosa</organization>
    <address>
      <postal>   
        <city>Toronto</city>
        <region>ON</region>
        <country>CA</country>
      </postal>
      <email>hugh@mimosa.com</email>
    </address>
  </author>

  <date month="July" year="2002"></date>

<abstract>
  <t>
This document describes opportunistic encryption (OE) using the Internet Key
Exchange (IKE) and IPsec.  
Each system administrator adds new
resource records to his or her Domain Name System (DNS) to support
opportunistic encryption. The objective is to allow encryption for secure communication without
any pre-arrangement specific to the pair of systems involved.
  </t>
  <t>
DNS is used to distribute the public keys of each
system involved. This is resistant to passive attacks. The use of DNS
Security (DNSSEC) secures this system against active attackers as well. 
  </t>
  <t>
As a result, the administrative overhead is reduced
from the square of the number of systems to a linear dependence, and it becomes  
possible to make secure communication the default even
when the partner is not known in advance.
  </t>
  <t>
This document is offered up as an Informational RFC.
  </t>
</abstract>

</front>

<middle>

<section title="Introduction">

<section title="Motivation">

<t>
The objective of opportunistic encryption is to allow encryption without
any pre-arrangement specific to the pair of systems involved. Each
system administrator adds
public key information to DNS records to support opportunistic
encryption and then enables this feature in the nodes' IPsec stack. 
Once this is done, any two such nodes can communicate securely.
</t>

<t>
This document describes opportunistic encryption as designed and
mostly implemented by the Linux FreeS/WAN project.
For project information, see http://www.freeswan.org.
</t>

  <t>
The Internet Architecture Board (IAB) and Internet Engineering
Steering Group (IESG) have taken a strong stand that the Internet
should use powerful encryption to provide security and
privacy <xref target="RFC1984" />.
The Linux FreeS/WAN project attempts to provide a practical means to implement this policy. 
  </t>

  <t>
The project uses the IPsec, ISAKMP/IKE, DNS and DNSSEC
protocols because they are
standardized, widely available and can often be deployed very easily
without changing hardware or software or retraining users. 
  </t>

  <t>
The extensions to support opportunistic encryption are simple.  No
changes to any on-the-wire formats are needed.  The only changes are to 
the policy decision making system.  This means that opportunistic
encryption can be implemented with very minimal changes to an existing 
IPsec implementation.
  </t>

  <t>
Opportunistic encryption creates a "fax effect". As each person
installs a fax machine for their own use, it becomes advantageous for their neighbors
to install one because the value of the fax machine as a tool increases
as more people have it. Once opportunistic encryption is installed it automatically recognizes 
other boxes using opportunistic encryption, without any further configuration by the network 
administrator. So, as opportunistic encryption software is installed on more boxes, it's value 
as a tool increases.
</t>

  <t>
This document describes the infrastructure to permit deployment of
Opportunistic Encryption.
</t>
 
  <t>
The term S/WAN is a trademark of RSA Data Systems, and is used with permission
by this project.
  </t>

</section>

<section title="Types of network traffic">
  <t>
    To aid in understanding the relationship between security processing and IPsec
    we divide network traffic into four categories:
    <list style="hanging">
      <t hangText="* Deny:"> networks to which traffic is always forbidden.</t>
      <t hangText="* Permit:"> networks to which traffic in the clear is permitted.</t>
      <t hangText="* Opportunistic tunnel:"> networks to which traffic is encrypted if possible, but otherwise is in the clear  
	    or fails depending on the default policy in place.	
      </t>
      <t hangText="* Configured tunnel:"> networks to which traffic must be encrypted, and traffic in the clear is never permitted.</t>
    </list>      
  </t>

<t>
Traditional firewall devices handle the first two categories. No authentication is required.
The permit policy is currently the default on the Internet. 
</t>

<t>
This document describes the third category - opportunistic tunnel, which is
proposed as the new default for the Internet.
</t>

<t>
  Category four, encrypt traffic or drop it, requires authentication of the
  end points. As the number of end points is typically bounded and is typically
  under a single authority, arranging for distribution of
  authentication material, while difficult, does not require any new
  technology. The mechanism described here provides an additional way to
  distribute the authentication materials, that of a public key method that does not
  require deployment of an X.509 based infrastructure.  
</t>
<t>
Current Virtual Private Networks can often be replaced by an "OE paranoid"
policy as described herein. 
</t>
</section>	

<section title="Peer authentication in opportunistic encryption">

  <t>
  Opportunistic encryption creates tunnels between nodes that
  are essentially strangers. This is done without any prior bilateral
  arrangement. 
  There is, therefore, the difficult question of how one knows to whom one is
  talking.
  </t>

  <t>
  One possible answer is that since no useful
  authentication can be done, none should be tried. This mode of operation is
  named "anonymous encryption".  An active man-in-the-middle attack can be
  used to thwart the privacy of this type of communication. 
  Without peer authentication, there is no way to prevent this kind of attack.
  </t>

  <t>
Although a useful mode, anonymous encryption is not the goal of this
project. Simpler methods are available that can achieve anonymous
encryption only, but authentication of the peer is a desireable goal.
The latter is achieved through key distribution in DNS, leveraging upon
the authentication of the DNS in DNSSEC.
</t>

  <t>
  Peers are, therefore, authenticated with DNSSEC when available. Local policy 
determines how much trust to extend when DNSSEC is not available.
  </t>

  <t>
  However, an essential premise of building private connections with
  strangers is that datagrams received through opportunistic tunnels
  are no more special than datagrams that arrive in the clear.
  Unlike in a VPN, these datagrams should not be given any special
  exceptions when it comes to auditing, further authentication or
  firewalling.
  </t>
  
  <t>
  When initiating outbound opportunistic encryption, local 
  configuration determines what happens if tunnel setup fails. It may be that
  the packet goes out in the clear, or it may be dropped.
  </t>

  </section>

<section title="Use of RFC2119 terms">
<t>
   The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD,
   SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL, when they appear in this
   document, are to be interpreted as described in <xref target="RFC2119" />
</t>
</section>

</section>

<section title="Overview">

  <section title="Reference diagram">

    <figure anchor="networkdiagram" title="Reference Network Diagram">
	   <preamble>The following network diagram is used in the rest of
		this document as the canonical diagram:</preamble>
           <artwork>
                          [Q]  [R]          
                           .    .              AS2                 
  [A]----+----[SG-A].......+....+.......[SG-B]-------[B]
         |                 ......
     AS1 |                 ..PI..
         |                 ......
  [D]----+----[SG-D].......+....+.......[C] AS3
             

           </artwork>
           <postamble></postamble>

       </figure>

    <t>
    In this diagram, there are four end-nodes: A, B, C and D. 
    There are three gateways, SG-A, SG-B, SG-D. A, D, SG-A and SG-D are part
    of the same administrative authority, AS1. SG-A and SG-D are on two different exit
    paths from organization 1. SG-B/B is an independent organization, AS2.
    Nodes Q and R are nodes on the Internet. PI is the Public
    Internet ("The Wild").
    </t>

  </section>

  <section title="Terminology">

  <t>
  The following terminology is used in this document:
  </t>

  <list style="hanging">
    <t hangText="Security gateway:"> a system that performs IPsec tunnel
    mode encapsulation/decapsulation. [SG-x] in the diagram.</t>
    <t hangText="Alice:"> node [A] in the diagram. When an IP address is needed, this is 192.1.0.65.</t>
    <t hangText="Bob:"> node [B] in the diagram. When an IP address is needed, this is 192.2.0.66.</t>
    <t hangText="Carol:"> node [C] in the diagram. When an IP address is needed, this is 192.1.1.67.</t>
    <t hangText="Dave:"> node [D] in the diagram. When an IP address is needed, this is 192.3.0.68.</t>
    <t hangText="SG-A:"> Alice's security gateway. Internally it is 192.1.0.1, externally it is 192.1.1.4.</t>
    <t hangText="SG-B:"> Bob's security gateway. Internally it is 192.2.0.1, externally it is 192.1.1.5.</t>
    <t hangText="SG-D:"> Dave's security gateway. Also Alice's backup security gateway. Internally it is 192.3.0.1, externally it is 192.1.1.6.</t>
    <t hangText="-"> A single dash represents clear-text datagrams.</t>
    <t hangText="="> An equals sign represents phase 2 (IPsec) cipher-text
        datagrams.</t> 
    <t hangText="~"> A single tilde represents clear-text phase 1 datagrams.</t>
    <t hangText="#"> A hash sign represents phase 1 (IKE) cipher-text
        datagrams.</t> 
    <t hangText="."> A period represents an untrusted network of unknown
        type.</t> 
    <t hangText="Configured tunnel:"> a tunnel that
		  is directly and deliberately hand configured on participating gateways.
		  Configured tunnels are typically given a higher level of
		  trust than opportunistic tunnels.</t> 

    <t hangText="Road warrior tunnel:"> a configured tunnel connecting one
		  node with a fixed IP address and one node with a variable IP address.
		  A road warrior (RW) connection must be initiated by the
		  variable node, since the fixed node cannot know the
		  current address for the road warrior. </t>

    <t hangText="Anonymous encryption:">
	the process of encrypting a session without any knowledge of who the
	other parties are. No authentication of identities is done.</t>

    <t hangText="Opportunistic encryption:">
	the process of encrypting a session with authenticated knowledge of
	who the other parties are.</t>

    <t hangText="Lifetime:">
        the period in seconds (bytes or datagrams) for which a security
	association will remain alive before needing to be re-keyed.</t>

    <t hangText="Lifespan:">
        the effective time for which a security association remains useful. A
	security association with a lifespan shorter than its lifetime would
	be removed when no longer needed. A security association with a
	lifespan longer than its lifetime would need to be re-keyed one or
	more times.</t>
    
    <t hangText="Phase 1 SA:"> an ISAKMP/IKE security association sometimes
      referred to as a keying channel.</t>

    <t hangText="Phase 2 SA:"> an IPsec security association.</t>

    <t hangText="Tunnel:"> another term for a set of phase 2 SA (one in each direction).</t>

    <t hangText="NAT:"> Network Address Translation
    (see <xref target="RFC2663" />).</t>

    <t hangText="NAPT:"> Network Address and Port Translation
    (see <xref target="RFC2663" />).</t>

    <t hangText="AS:"> an autonomous system (AS) is a group of systems (a network) that
		are under the administrative control of a single organization.</t>

    <t hangText="Default-free zone:"> 
    a set of routers that maintain a complete set of routes to
    all currently reachable destinations. Having such a list, these routers
    never make use of a default route. A datagram with a destination address
    not matching any route will be dropped by such a router.
    </t>

  </list>
  </section>

<section title="Model of operation">

<t>
The opportunistic encryption security gateway (OE gateway) is a regular
gateway node as described in <xref target="RFC0791" /> section 2.4 and  
<xref target="RFC1009" /> with the additional capabilities described here and
in <xref target="RFC2401" />.  
The algorithm described here provides a way to determine, for each datagram,
whether or not to encrypt and tunnel the datagram. Two important things
that must be determined are whether or not to encrypt and tunnel and, if
so, the destination address or name of the tunnel end point which should be used. 
</t>

<section title="Tunnel authorization">
<t>
The OE gateway determines whether or not to create a tunnel based on 
the destination address of each packet. Upon receiving a packet with a destination
address not recently seen, the OE gateway performs a lookup in DNS for an
authorization resource record (see <xref target="TXT"/>). The record is located using
the IP address to perform a search in the in-addr.arpa (IPv4) or ip6.arpa
(IPv6) maps. If an authorization record is found, the OE gateway 
interprets this as a request for a tunnel to be formed.
</t>
</section> 

<section title="Tunnel end-point discovery">

<t>
The authorization resource record also provides the address or name of the tunnel
end point which should be used.
</t>
<t>
The record may also provide the public RSA key of the tunnel end point
itself. This is provided for efficiency only. If the public RSA key is not 
present, the OE gateway performs a second lookup to find a KEY 
resource record for the end point address or name.
</t>
<t>
Origin and integrity protection of the resource records is provided by 
DNSSEC (<xref target="RFC2535"/>). <xref target="nodnssec"/>
documents an optional restriction on the tunnel end point if DNSSEC signatures
are not available for the relevant records. 
</t>

</section>

<section title="Caching of authorization results">
<t>
The OE gateway maintains a cache, in the forwarding plane, of
source/destination pairs for which opportunistic encryption has been
attempted. This cache maintains a record of whether or not OE was
successful so that subsequent datagrams can be forwarded properly
without additional delay. 
</t>

<t>
Successful negotiation of OE instantiates a new security association. 
Failure to negotiate OE results in creation of a 
forwarding policy entry either to drop or transmit in the clear future
datagrams. This negative cache is necessary to avoid the possibly lengthy process of repeatedly looking 
up the same information.
</t>

<t>
The cache is timed out periodically, as described in <xref target="teardown" />.
This removes entries that are no longer
being used and permits the discovery of changes in authorization policy.
</t>
</section>

</section> <!-- "Model of operation" -->

</section> <!-- "Overview" -->

<section title="Specification">

<t>
The OE gateway is modeled to have a forwarding plane and a control
plane. A control channel, such as PF_KEY, connects the two planes. 
(See <xref target="RFC2367" />.)
The forwarding plane performs per datagram operations. The control plane
contains a keying 
daemon, such as ISAKMP/IKE, and performs all authorization, peer authentication and
key derivation functions.  
</t>

<section title="Datagram state machine">

<t>
Let the OE gateway maintain a collection of objects -- a superset of the
security policy database (SPD) specified in <xref target="RFC2401" />. For
each combination of source and destination address, an SPD
object exists in one of five states. Prior to forwarding each datagram, the
responder uses the source and destination addresses to pick an entry from the SPD.
The SPD then determines if and how the packet is forwarded.
</t>
<section title="Non-existent policy">
<t>
If the responder does not find an entry, then this policy applies.
The responder creates an entry with an initial state of "hold policy" and requests 
keying material from the keying daemon. The responder does not forward the datagram,
rather it attaches the datagram to the SPD entry as the  "first" datagram and retains it
for eventual transmission in a new state. 

</t>
</section>

<section title="Hold policy">
<t>
The responder requests keying material. If the interface to the keying
system is lossy (PF_KEY, for instance, can be), the implementation 
SHOULD include a mechanism to retransmit the
keying request at a rate limited to less than 1 request per second.
The responder does not forward the datagram. It attaches the 
datagram to the SPD entry as the "last" datagram where it is retained 
for eventual transmission. If there is
a datagram already so stored, then that already stored datagram is discarded.
</t>
<t>
Because the "first" datagram is probably a TCP SYN packet, the 
responder retains the "first" datagram in an attempt to avoid waiting for a
TCP retransmit. The responder retains the "last"
datagram in deference to streaming protocols that find it useful to know
how much data has been lost. These are recommendations to 
decrease latency. There are no operational requirements for this.
</t>
</section>

<section title="Pass-through policy">
<t>
The responder forwards the datagram using the normal forwarding table. 
The responder enters this state only by command from the keying daemon, 
and upon entering this state, forwards the "first" and "last" datagrams.
</t>
</section>

<section title="Deny policy">
<t>
The responder discards the datagram. The responder enters this state only by command 
from the keying daemon, and upon entering this state, discards the "first" and "last" datagrams. 
Local administration decides if further datagrams cause ICMP messages
to be generated (i.e. ICMP Administratively denied).
</t>
</section>

<section title="Encrypt policy">
<t>
The responder encrypts the datagram using the indicated security association database
(SAD) entry.  The responder enters this state only by command from the keying daemon, and upon entering
this state, releases and forwards the "first" and "last" datagrams using the
new encrypt policy.  
</t>
<t>
If the associated SAD entry expires because of byte, packet or time limits, then
the entry returns to the Hold policy, and an expire message is sent to the keying daemon.
</t>
</section>

<t>
All states may be created directly by the keying daemon while acting as a
responder. 
</t>

</section> <!-- "Datagram state machine" -->


<section anchor="initclasses" title="Keying state machine - initiator">
<t>
Let the keying daemon maintain a collection of objects. Let them be
called "connections" or "conn"s. There are two categories of
connection objects: classes and instances. A class represents an
abstract policy - what could be. An instance represents an actual connection -  
what is implemented at the time.
</t>

<t>
Let there be two further subtypes of connections: keying channels (Phase
1 SAs) and data channels (Phase 2 SAs). Each data channel object may have 
a corresponding SPD and SAD entry maintained by the datagram state machine.
</t>

<t>
For the purposes of opportunistic encryption, there MUST, at least, be
connection classes known as "deny", "always-clear-text", "OE-permissive", and 
"OE-paranoid".  
The latter two connection classes define a set of source and/or destination
addresses for which opportunistic encryption will be attempted. The administrator MAY set policy
options in a number of additional places.  An implementation MAY create additional connection classes to further refine
these policies.
</t>

<t>
The simplest system may need only the "OE-permissive" connection, and would
list its own (single) IP address as the source address of this policy and
the wild-card address 0.0.0.0/0 as the destination IPv4 address. That is, the
simplest policy is to try opportunistic encryption with all destinations. 
</t>

<t>
The distinction between permissive and paranoid OE use will become clear 
in the state transition differences. In general a permissive OE will, on
failure, install a pass-through policy, while a paranoid OE will, on failure, 
install a drop policy.
</t>

<t>
In this description of the keying machines state transitions, the states
associated with the keying system itself are omitted because they are best documented in the keying system 
(<xref target="RFC2407" />, 
<xref target="RFC2408" /> and <xref target="RFC2409" /> for ISAKMP/IKE),
and the details are keying system specific. Opportunistic encryption is not
dependent upon any specific keying protocol, but this document does provide
requirements for those using ISAKMP/IKE to assure that implementations inter-operate.
</t>
<t>
The state transitions that may be involved in communicating with the
forwarding plane are omitted. PF_KEY and similar protocols have their own
set of states required for message sends and completion notifications.
</t>
<t>
Finally, the retransmits and recursive lookups that are normal for DNS are 
not included in this description of the state machine.
</t>

<section title="Nonexistent connection">
<t>
There is no connection instance for a given source/destination address pair.
Upon receipt of a request for keying material for this
source/destination pair, the initiator searches through the connection classes to
determine the most appropriate policy. Upon determining an appropriate
connection class, an instance object is created of that type. 
Both of the OE types result in a potential OE connection.
</t>
<t>Failure to find an appropriate connection class results in an
administrator defined default. 
</t>
<t>
In each case, when the initiator finds an appropriate class for the new flow, 
an instance connection is made of the class which matched.
</t>
</section>

<section title="Clear-text connection">
<t>
The non-existent connection makes a transition to this state when an
always-clear-text class is instantiated, or when an OE-permissive 
connection fails. During the transition, the initiator creates a pass-through
policy object in the forwarding plane for the appropriate flow.
</t>
<t>
Timing out is the only way to leave this state
(see <xref target="expiring" />).
</t>
</section>

<section title="Deny connection">
<t>
The empty connection makes a transition to this state when a
deny class is instantiated, or when an OE-paranoid connection fails. 
During the transition, the initiator creates a deny policy object in the forwarding plane 
for the appropriate flow.  
</t>
<t>
Timing out is the only way to leave this state 
(see <xref target="expiring" />).
</t>
</section>

<section title="Potential OE connection">
<t>
The empty connection makes a transition to this state when one of either OE class is instantiated.
During the transition to this state, the initiator creates a hold policy object in the 
forwarding plane for the appropriate flow.  
</t>
<t>
In addition, when making a transition into this state, DNS lookup is done in
the reverse map for a TXT delegation resource record (see <xref target="TXT" />).
The lookup key is the destination address of the flow.
</t>
<t>
There are three ways to exit this state: 
DNS lookup finds or does not find a TXT delegation resource record, or DNS lookup times out.
</t>
<t>
There are three ways to exit this state: 
<list style="numbers">
<t>DNS lookup finds a TXT delegation resource record.</t>
<t>DNS lookup does not find a TXT delegation resource record.</t>
<t>DNS lookup times out.</t>
</list>
</t>

<t>
If DNS lookup finds a resource record, and it is properly formatted, and if
DNSSEC is enabled and the signature has been vouched for (either through local
confirmation or through a trusted path to a recursive DNSSEC server), then the 
potential OE connection makes a transition to the pending OE connection state. 
Note that if the initiator does not find the public key 
present in the TXT delegation record, then the public key must 
be looked up as a sub-state. Only successful completion of all the 
DNS lookups is considered a success.
</t>
<t>
If DNS lookup does not find a resource record or DNS times out, then the 
initiator considers the receiver not OE capable. If this is an OE-paranoid instance, 
then the potential OE connection makes a transition to the deny connection state.
If this is an OE-permissive instance, then the potential OE connection makes a transition to the
clear-text connection state.
</t>
<t>
If the initiator finds a resource record but it is not properly formatted, or
if DNSSEC is 
enabled and reports a failure to authenticate, then the potential OE
connection should make a 
transition to the deny connection state. This action SHOULD be logged. If the
administrator wishes to override this transition between states, then an
always-clear class can be installed for this flow. An implementation MAY make
this situation a new class.
</t>

<section anchor="nodnssec" title="Restriction on unauthenticated TXT delegation records">
<t>
An implementation SHOULD also provide an additional administrative control
on delegation records and DNSSEC. This control would apply to delegation
records (the TXT records in the reverse map) that are not protected by
DNSSEC.
Records of this type are only permitted to delegate to their own address as
a gateway. When this option is enabled, an active attack on DNS will be
unable to redirect packets to other than the original destination.
<!-- This was asked for by Bill Sommerfeld -->
</t>
</section>
</section>

<section title="Pending OE connection">
<t>
The potential OE connection makes a transition to this state when 
the initiator determines that all the information required from the DNS lookup is present.
Upon entering this state, the initiator attempts to initiate keying to the gateway
provided.  
</t>
<t>
Exit from this state occurs either with a successfully created IPsec SA, or
with a failure of some kind.  Successful SA creation results in a transition
to the key connection state.
</t>
<t>
Three failures have caused significant problems. They are clearly not the
only possible failures from keying.
</t>
<t>
Note that if there are multiple gateways available in the TXT delegation
records, then a failure can only be declared after all have been
tried. Further, creation of a phase 1 SA does not constitute success. A set
of phase 2 SAs (a tunnel) is considered success.
</t>
<t>
The first failure occurs when an ICMP port unreachable is consistently received
without any other communication, or when there is silence from the remote
end. This usually means that either the gateway is not alive, or the
keying daemon is not functional. For an OE-permissive connection, the initiator makes a transition
to the clear-text connection but with a low lifespan. For an OE-pessimistic connection,
the initiator makes a transition to the deny connection again with a low lifespan. The lifespan in both 
cases is kept low because the remote gateway may
be in the process of rebooting or be otherwise temporarily unavailable. 
</t>
<t>
The length of time to wait for the remote keying daemon to wake up is
a matter of some debate. If there is a routing failure, 5 minutes is usually long enough for the network to
re-converge. Many systems can reboot in that amount of
time as well. However, 5 minutes is far too long for most users to wait to
hear that they can not connect using OE. Implementations SHOULD make this a
tunable parameter.
</t>
<t>
The second failure occurs after a phase 1 SA has been created, but there is 
either no response to the phase 2 proposal, or the initiator receives a 
negative notify (the notify must be 
authenticated). The remote gateway is not prepared to do OE at this time. 
As before, the initiator makes a transition to the clear-text or the deny 
connection based upon connection class, but this
time with a normal lifespan. 
</t>
<t>
The third failure occurs when there is signature failure while authenticating
the remote gateway. This can occur when there has been a 
key roll-over, but DNS has not caught up. In this case again, the initiator makes a 
transition to the clear-text or the deny connection based
upon the connection class. However, the lifespan depends upon the remaining
time to live in the DNS. (Note that DNSSEC signed resource records have a different
expiry time than non-signed records.) 
<!-- dig @gateway would also work here -->
</t>

</section>

<section anchor="keyed" title="Keyed connection">
<t>
The pending OE connection makes a transition to this state when 
session keying material (the phase 2 SAs) is derived. The initiator creates an encrypt
policy in the forwarding plane for this flow.
</t>
<t>
There are three ways to exit this state. The first is by receipt of an
authenticated delete message (via the keying channel) from the peer. This is
normal teardown and results in a transition to the expired connection state.
</t>
<t>
The second exit is by expiry of the forwarding plane keying material. This
starts a re-key operation with a transition back to pending OE
connection. In general, the soft expiry occurs with sufficient time left
to continue to use the keys. A re-key can fail, which may
result in the connection failing to clear-text or deny as
appropriate. In the event of a failure, the forwarding plane
policy does not change until the phase 2 SA (IPsec SA) reaches its
hard expiry.
</t>
<t>
The third exit is in response to a negotiation from a remote
gateway. If the forwarding plane signals the control plane that it has received an
unknown SPI from the remote gateway, or an ICMP is received from the remote gateway
indicating an unknown SPI, the initiator should consider that 
the remote gateway has rebooted or restarted. Since these 
indications are easily forged, the implementation must 
exercise care.  The initiator should make a cautious 
(rate-limited) attempt to re-key the connection. 
</t>
</section>

<section anchor="expiring" title="Expiring connection">
<t>
The initiator will periodically place each of the deny, clear-text, and keyed connections into this 
sub-state. See <xref target="teardown" /> for more details of how often this occurs.
The initiator queries the forwarding plane for last use time of the appropriate
policy. If the last use time is relatively recent, then the connection returns to the
previous deny, clear-text or keyed connection state. If not, then the connection enters
the expired connection state.
</t>
<t>
The DNS query and answer that lead to the expiring connection state are also
examined. The DNS query may become stale. (A negative, i.e. no such record, answer
is valid for the period of time given by the MINIMUM field in an attached SOA 
record. See <xref target="RFC1034" /> section 4.3.4.)
If the DNS query is stale, then a new query is made. If the results change, then the connection 
makes a transition to a new state as described in potential OE connection state.
</t>
<t> 
Note that both outgoing SPD and incoming SAD must be queried as some flows
may be unidirectional for some time.
</t>
<t>
Note that the policy at the forwarding plane is not updated unless there
is a conclusion that there should be a change. 
</t>

</section>
<section title="Expired connection">
<t>
Entry to this state occurs when no datagrams have been forwarded recently via the
appropriate SPD and SAD objects. The objects in the forwarding plane are
removed (logging any final byte and packet counts if appropriate) and the
connection instance in the keying plane is deleted. 
</t>
<t>
The initiator sends an ISAKMP/IKE delete to clean up the phase 2 SAs as described in
<xref target="teardown" />. 
</t>
<t>
Whether or not to also delete the phase 1 SAs
at this time is left as a local implementation issue. Implementations
that do delete the phase 1 SAs MUST send authenticated delete messages to
indicate that they are doing so.  There is an advantage to keeping
the phase 1 SAs until they expire - they may prove useful again in the 
near future.
</t>
</section>

</section> <!-- "Keying state machine - initiator" -->

<section title="Keying state machine - responder">
<t>
The responder has a set of objects identical to those of the initiator.
</t>
<t>
The responder receives an invitation to create a keying channel from an initiator. 
</t>

<section title="Unauthenticated OE peer">
<t>
Upon entering this state, the responder starts a DNS lookup for a KEY record for the
initiator. 
The responder looks in the reverse map for a KEY record for the initiator if the
initiator has offered an ID_IPV4_ADDR, and in the forward map if the
initiator has offered an ID_FQDN type. (See <xref target="RFC2407" /> section 
4.6.2.1.)
</t>
<t>
The responder exits this state upon successful receipt of a KEY from DNS, and use of the key 
to verify the signature of the initiator.
</t>

<!--
<t>
The public key that is retrieved should be stored in stable storage for an
administratively defined period of time, (typically several months if
possible). If a key has previously been stored on disk, then the returned key
should be compared to what has been received, and the key considered valid
only if they match.  
</t>
-->

<t>
Successful authentication of the peer results in a transition to the
authenticated OE Peer state.
</t>
<t>
Note that the unauthenticated OE peer state generally occurs in the middle of the key negotiation
protocol. It is really a form of pseudo-state.
</t>
</section>

<section title="Authenticated OE Peer">
<t>
The peer will eventually propose one or more phase 2 SAs. The responder uses the source and
destination address in the proposal to 
finish instantiating the connection state
using the connection class table.
The responder MUST search for an identical connection object at this point. 
</t>
<t> 
If an identical connection is found, then the responder deletes the old instance, 
and the new object makes a transition to the pending OE connection state. This means
that new ISAKMP connections with a given peer will always use the latest
instance, which is the correct one if the peer has rebooted in the interim.
</t>
<t> 
If an identical connection is not found, then the responder makes the transition according to the 
rules given for the initiator.
</t>
<t> 
Note that if the initiator is in OE-paranoid mode and the responder is in 
either always-clear-text or deny, then no communication is possible according
to policy. An implementation is permitted to create new types of policies 
such as "accept OE but do not initiate it". This is a local matter.
 </t>
</section>

</section> <!-- "Keying state machine - responder" -->

<section anchor="teardown" title="Renewal and teardown">
  <section title="Aging">
<t>
A potentially unlimited number of tunnels may exist. In practice, only a few
tunnels are used during a period of time. Unused tunnels MUST, therefore, be
torn down. Detecting when tunnels are no longer in use is the subject of this section.
</t>

<t>
There are two methods for removing tunnels: explicit deletion or expiry. 
</t>

<t>
Explicit deletion requires an IKE delete message. As the deletes
MUST be authenticated, both ends of the tunnel must maintain the 
key channel (phase 1 ISAKMP SA). An implementation which refuses to either maintain or
recreate the keying channel SA will be unable to use this method.
</t>

<t>
The tunnel expiry method, simply allows the IKE daemon to
expire normally without attempting to re-key it.
</t>

<t>
Regardless of which method is used to remove tunnels, the implementation requires 
a method to determine if the tunnel is still in use.  The specifics are a
local matter, but  the FreeS/WAN project uses the following criteria. These
criteria are currently implemented in the key management daemon, but could
also be implemented at the SPD layer using an idle timer.
</t>

<t>
Set a short initial (soft) lifespan of 1 minute since many net flows last
only a few seconds.
</t>

<t>
At the end of the lifespan, check to see if the tunnel was used by
traffic in either direction during the last 30 seconds. If so, assign a
longer tentative lifespan of 20 minutes after which, look again. If the
tunnel is not in use, then close the tunnel.
</t>

<t>
The expiring state in the key management
system (see <xref target="expiring" />) implements these timeouts.
The timer above may be in the forwarding plane, 
but then it must be re-settable. 
</t>

<t>
The tentative lifespan is independent of re-keying; it is just the time when
the tunnel's future is next considered. 
(The term lifespan is used here rather than lifetime for this reason.) 
Unlike re-keying, this tunnel use check is not costly and should happen
reasonably frequently.
</t> 

<t>
A multi-step back-off algorithm is not considered worth the effort here.
</t>

<t>
If the security gateway and the client host are the
same and not a Bump-in-the-Stack or Bump-in-the-Wire implementation, tunnel
teardown decisions MAY pay attention to TCP connection status as reported
by the local TCP layer.  A still-open TCP connection is almost a guarantee that more traffic is
expected. Closing of the only TCP connection through a tunnel is a
strong hint that no more traffic is expected.
</t>

</section> <!-- "Aging" -->

<section title="Teardown and cleanup">

<t>
Teardown should always be coordinated between the two ends of the tunnel by 
interpreting and sending delete notifications. There is a
detailed sub-state in the expired connection state of the key manager that
relates to retransmits of the delete notifications, but this is considered to 
be a keying system detail.
</t>

<t>
On receiving a delete for the outbound SAs of a tunnel (or some subset of
them), tear down the inbound ones also and notify the remote end with a
delete. If the local system receives a delete for a tunnel which is no longer in
existence, then two delete messages have crossed paths. Ignore the delete.
The operation has already been completed. Do not generate any messages in this
situation. 
</t>
<t>
Tunnels are to be considered as bidirectional entities, even though the
low-level protocols don't treat them this way. 
</t>

<t>
When the deletion is initiated locally, rather than as a
response to a received delete, send a delete for (all) the
inbound SAs of a tunnel.  If the local system does not receive a responding delete 
for the outbound SAs, try re-sending the original
delete. Three tries spaced 10 seconds apart seems a reasonable
level of effort. A failure of the other end to respond after 3 attempts, 
indicates that the possibility of further communication is unlikely. Remove the outgoing SAs.
(The remote system may be a mobile node that is no longer present or powered on.)
</t>

<t>
After re-keying, transmission should switch to using the new
outgoing SAs (ISAKMP or IPsec) immediately, and the old leftover
outgoing SAs should be cleared out promptly (delete should be sent
for the outgoing SAs) rather than waiting for them to expire. This
reduces clutter and minimizes confusion for the operator doing diagnostics.
</t>

</section>

</section>

</section> <!-- "Specification" -->

<section title="Impacts on IKE">

  <section title="ISAKMP/IKE protocol">
    <t>
    The IKE wire protocol needs no modifications. The major changes are
    implementation issues relating to how the proposals are interpreted, and from
    whom they may come.
    </t>
    <t>
    As opportunistic encryption is designed to be useful between peers without
    prior operator configuration, an IKE daemon must be prepared to negotiate
    phase 1 SAs with any node. This may require a large amount of resources to 
    maintain cookie state, as well as large amounts of entropy for nonces,
    cookies and so on. 
    </t>
    <t>
    The major changes to support opportunistic encryption are at the IKE daemon
    level. These changes relate to handling of key acquisition requests, lookup
    of public keys and TXT records, and interactions with firewalls and other
    security facilities that may be co-resident on the same gateway.
    </t>
  </section>

  <section title="Gateway discovery process">
  <t>
  In a typical configured tunnel, the address of SG-B is provided
  via configuration. Furthermore, the mapping of an SPD entry to a gateway is
  typically a 1:1 mapping. When the 0.0.0.0/0 SPD entry technique is used, then
  the mapping to a gateway is determined by the reverse DNS records.
  </t>
  <t>
  The need to do a DNS lookup and wait for a reply will typically introduce a
  new state and a new event source (DNS replies) to IKE. Although a
synchronous DNS request can be implemented for proof of concept, experience
is that it can cause very high latencies when a queue of queries must
all timeout in series. 
  </t>
  <t> 
  Use of an asynchronous DNS lookup will also permit overlap of DNS lookups with
  some of the protocol steps.
  </t>
  </section>

  <section title="Self identification">
  <t>
     SG-A will have to establish its identity. Use an
     IPv4 ID in phase 1. 
  </t>
  <t> There are many situations where the administrator of SG-A may not be
      able to control the reverse DNS records for SG-A's public IP address.
      Typical situations include dialup connections and most residential-type broadband Internet access 
      (ADSL, cable-modem) connections. In these situations, a fully qualified domain
      name that is under the control of SG-A's administrator may be used
      when acting as an initiator only.
      The FQDN ID should be used in phase 1. See <xref target="fqdn" />
      for more details and restrictions.
  </t>
  </section>

  <section title="Public key retrieval process">
  <t>
     Upon receipt of a phase 1 SA proposal with either an IPv4 (IPv6) ID or
     an FQDN ID, an IKE daemon needs to examine local caches and
     configuration files to determine if this is part of a configured tunnel.
     If no configured tunnels are found, then the implementation should attempt to retrieve
     a KEY record from the reverse DNS in the case of an IPv4/IPv6 ID, or 
     from the forward DNS in the case of FQDN ID.
  </t>
  <t> 
     It is reasonable that if other non-local sources of policy are used
     (COPS, LDAP), they be consulted concurrently but some
     clear ordering of policy be provided. Note that due to variances in
     latency, implementations must wait for positive or negative replies from all sources
     of policy before making any decisions.
  </t>
  </section>
  
  <section title="Interactions with DNSSEC">
  <t>
     The implementation described (1.98) neither uses DNSSEC directly to
     explicitly verify the authenticity of zone information, nor uses the NXT
     records to provide authentication of the absence of a TXT or KEY
     record. Rather, this implementation uses a trusted path to a DNSSEC
     capable caching resolver. 
  </t>
  <t> 
     To distinguish between an authenticated and an unauthenticated DNS
     resource record, a stub resolver capable of returning DNSSEC
     information MUST be used.
  </t>
     
  </section>

<!--
  <section title="Interactions with COPS">
  <t>
     At this time there is no experience with implementations that interact
     with COPS Policy Decision Points (PDP) <xref target="RFC2748" />. It is
     suggested that it may be 
     appropriate for many of 
     the policy and discovery mechanisms outlined here to be done by a PDP.
     In this context, the IKE daemon present in the Policy Enforcement Point
     (PEP) may not need any modifications.
  </t>
  </section>
-->

  <section title="Required proposal types">

    <section anchor="phase1id" title="Phase 1 parameters">
      <t>
        Main mode MUST be used.
      </t>
      <t>
	The initiator MUST offer at least one proposal using some combination
	of: 3DES, HMAC-MD5 or HMAC-SHA1, DH group 2 or 5. Group 5 SHOULD be
	proposed first.
	<xref target="MODPGROUPS" />
      </t>
      <t>
	The initiator MAY offer additional proposals, but the cipher MUST not
	be weaker than 3DES. The initiator SHOULD limit the number of proposals
	such that the IKE datagrams do not need to be fragmented.
      </t>
      <t>
	The responder MUST accept one of the proposals. If any configuration
	of the responder is required then the responder is not acting in an
	opportunistic way. 
      </t>
      <t>
        SG-A SHOULD use an ID_IPV4_ADDR (ID_IPV6_ADDR for IPv6) of the external
        interface of SG-A for phase 1. (There is an exception, see <xref
        target="fqdn" />.) The authentication method MUST be RSA public key signatures. 
        The RSA key for SG-A SHOULD be placed into a DNS KEY record in
	the reverse space of SG-A (i.e. using in-addr.arpa).
      </t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="phase2id" title="Phase 2 parameters">
      <t>
        SG-A MUST propose a tunnel between Alice and Bob, using 3DES-CBC
        mode, MD5 or SHA1 authentication. Perfect Forward Secrecy MUST be specified.
      </t>
      <t>
        Tunnel mode MUST be used.
      </t>
      <t>
        Identifies MUST be ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET with the mask being /32.
      </t>
      <t>
        Authorization for SG-A to act on Alice's behalf is determined by
        looking for a TXT record in the reverse map at Alice's address.
      </t>
      <t>
        Compression SHOULD NOT be mandatory. It may be offered as an option.
      </t>
    </section>
  </section>

</section>

<section title="DNS issues">
  <section anchor="KEY" title="Use of KEY record">
  <t>
    In order to establish their own identity, SG-A and SG-B SHOULD publish
    their public keys in their reverse DNS via 
    DNSSEC's KEY record.
    See section 3 of <xref target="RFC2535">RFC 2535</xref>.
  </t>	
  <t>
    <preamble>For example:</preamble>
    <artwork><![CDATA[
KEY 0x4200 4 1 AQNJjkKlIk9...nYyUkKK8
]]></artwork>

  <list style="hanging">
  <t hangText="0x4200:"> The flag bits, indicating that this key is prohibited
    for confidentiality use (it authenticates the peer only, a seperate
    Diffie-Hellman exchange is used for
    confidentiality), and that this key is associated with the non-zone entity
    whose name is the RR owner name. No other flags are set.</t>
  <t hangText="4:">This indicates that this key is for use by IPsec.</t>
  <t hangText="1:">An RSA key is present.</t>
  <t hangText="AQNJjkKlIk9...nYyUkKK8:">The public key of the host as described in <xref target="RFC3110" />.</t> 
  </list>
  </t>
  <t>Use of several KEY records allows for key rollover. The SIG Payload in
  IKE phase 1 SHOULD be accepted if the public key given by any KEY RR
  validates it.
  </t>
  </section>

  <section anchor="TXT" title="Use of TXT delegation record">
    <t>
Alice publishes a TXT record to provide authorization for SG-A to act on
Alice's behalf. 

Bob publishes a TXT record to provide authorization for SG-B to act on Bob's
behalf.  

These records are located in the reverse DNS (in-addr.arpa) for their
respective IP addresses.  The reverse DNS SHOULD be secured by DNSSEC, when
it is deployed. DNSSEC is required to defend against active attacks.
    </t>
    <t>
      If Alice's address is P.Q.R.S, then she can authorize another node to
      act on her behalf by publishing records at:
           <artwork><![CDATA[
S.R.Q.P.in-addr.arpa
          ]]></artwork>
    </t>

    <t>
    The contents of the resource record are expected to be a string that
    uses the following syntax, as suggested in <xref target="RFC1464" />.
    (Note that the reply to query may include other TXT resource
    records used by other applications.)

    <figure anchor="txtformat" title="Format of reverse delegation record">
           <artwork><![CDATA[
X-IPsec-Server(P)=A.B.C.D KEY
          ]]></artwork>
    </figure>
    </t>

    <list style="hanging"> 
      <t hangText="P:"> Specifies a precedence for this record.  This is
      similar to MX record preferences.  Lower numbers have stronger
      preference. 
      </t>  

      <t hangText="A.B.C.D:"> Specifies the IP address of the Security Gateway
      for this client machine.
      </t>

      <t hangText="KEY:"> Is the encoded RSA Public key of the Security
      Gateway. The key is provided here to avoid a second DNS lookup. If this
      field is absent, then a KEY resource record should be looked up in the
      reverse map of A.B.C.D. The key is transmitted in base64 format.
      </t> 
    </list>

    <t>
  	The pieces of the record are separated by any whitespace
	(space, tab, newline, carriage return). An ASCII space SHOULD
	be used.
    </t>

    <t>
	In the case where Alice is located at a public address behind a 
	security gateway that has no fixed address (or no control over its
	reverse map), then Alice may delegate to a public key by domain name.

    <figure anchor="txtfqdnformat"
            title="Format of reverse delegation record (FQDN version)">
           <artwork><![CDATA[
X-IPsec-Server(P)=@FQDN KEY
          ]]></artwork>
    </figure>
    </t>

    <list style="hanging"> 
      <t hangText="P:"> Is as above.
      </t>  

      <t hangText="FQDN:"> Specifies the FQDN that the Security Gateway
      will identify itself with. 
      </t>

      <t hangText="KEY:"> Is the encoded RSA Public key of the Security
      Gateway. </t> 
    </list>

    <t>
	If there is more than one such TXT record with strongest (lowest
	numbered) precedence, one Security Gateway is picked arbitrarily from
	those specified in the strongest-preference records. 
    </t>
 
  <section title="Long TXT records">
  <t>
  When packed into transport format, TXT records which are longer than 255
  characters are divided into smaller &lt;character-strings&gt;.
  (See <xref target="RFC1035" /> section 3.3 and 3.3.14.) These should 
  be reassembled into a single string for processing.
  Whitespace characters in the base64 encoding are to be ignored.
  </t>
  </section>

  <section title="Choice of TXT record">
  <t>
	It has been suggested to use the KEY, OPT, CERT, or KX records
	instead of a TXT record. None is satisfactory.
  </t>
  <t> The KEY RR has a protocol field which could be used to indicate a new protocol, 
and an algorithm field which could be used to
        indicate different contents in the key data. However, the KEY record
	is clearly not intended for storing what are really authorizations,
	it is just for identities. Other uses have been discouraged.
  </t>
  <t> OPT resource records, as defined in <xref target="RFC2671" /> are not 
  intended to be used for storage of information. They are not to be loaded, 
	cached or forwarded.  They are, therefore, inappropriate for use here.
  </t>
  <t>
    CERT records <xref target="RFC2538" /> can encode almost any set of
    information. A custom type code could be used permitting any suitable
    encoding to be stored, not just X.509.  According to
    the RFC, the certificate RRs are to be signed internally which may add undesirable 
and unnecessary bulk. Larger DNS records may require TCP instead of UDP transfers.
  </t>
  <t>
    At the time of protocol design, the CERT RR was not widely deployed and
    could not be counted upon. Use of CERT records will be investigated,
    and may be proposed in a future revision of this document.
  </t>
  <t>
    KX records are ideally suited for use instead of TXT records, but had not been deployed at
    the time of implementation.
<!-- Jakob Schlyter <j@crt.se> confirmed -->
  </t>	
  </section>
  </section>

  <section anchor="fqdn" title="Use of FQDN IDs">
    <t>
      Unfortunately, not every administrator has control over the contents
      of the reverse-map.  Where the initiator (SG-A) has no suitable reverse map, the
      authorization record present in the reverse map of Alice may refer to a
      FQDN instead of an IP address.
    </t>
    <t>
      In this case, the client's TXT record gives the fully qualified domain
      name (FQDN) in place of its security gateway's IP address. 
      The initiator should use the ID_FQDN ID-payload in phase 1.
      A forward lookup for a KEY record on the FQDN must yield the
      initiator's public key. 
    </t>
    <t>
      This method can also be used when the external address of SG-A is
      dynamic. 
    </t>
    <t>
      If SG-A is acting on behalf of Alice, then Alice must still delegate
      authority for SG-A to do so in her reverse map. When Alice and SG-A
      are one and the same (i.e. Alice is acting as an end-node) then there
      is no need for this when initiating only. </t>
    <t>However, Alice must still delegate to  herself if she wishes others to
       initiate OE to her.  See <xref target="txtfqdnformat" />.
    </t>
    <
  </section> 

<section title="Key roll-over">
<t>
Good cryptographic hygiene says that one should replace public/private key pairs
periodically. Some administrators may wish to do this as often as daily. Typical DNS
propagation delays are determined by the SOA Resource Record MINIMUM
parameter, which controls how long DNS replies may be cached. For reasonable
operation of DNS servers, administrators usually want this value to be at least several 
hours, sometimes as a long as a day. This presents a problem - a new key MUST
not be used prior to it propagating through DNS.
</t>
<t>
This problem is dealt with by having the Security Gateway generate a new
public/private key pair at least MINIMUM seconds in advance of using it. It
then adds this key to the DNS (both as a second KEY record and in additional TXT
delegation records) at key generation time. Note: only one key is allowed in
each TXT record.
</t>
<t>
When authenticating, all gateways MUST have available all public keys 
that are found in DNS for this entity. This permits the authenticating end
to check both the key for "today" and the key for "tomorrow". Note that it is 
the end which is creating the signature (possesses the private key) that
determines which key is to be used.
</t>

  </section>
</section>


<section title="Network address translation interaction">
  <t>
     There are no fundamentally new issues for implementing opportunistic encryption
     in the presence of network address translation. Rather there are 
     only the regular IPsec issues with NAT traversal.
  </t>
  <t>
     There are several situations to consider for NAT.
  </t>
  <section title="Co-located NAT/NAPT">
    <t>
       If SG-A is also performing network address translation on
       behalf of Alice, then the packet should be translated prior to
       being subjected to opportunistic encryption. This is in contrast to
       typically configured tunnels which often exist to bridge islands of 
       private network address space. SG-A will use the translated source
       address for phase 2, and so SG-B will look up that address to
       confirm SG-A's authorization. 
    </t>
    <t> In the case of NAT (1:1), the address space into which the
        translation is done MUST be globally unique, and control over the
	reverse map is assumed.
        Placing of TXT records is possible.
    </t>
    <t> In the case of NAPT (m:1), the address will be SG-A. The ability to get
        KEY and TXT records in place will again depend upon whether or not
	there is administrative control over the reverse map. This is
	identical to situations involving a single host acting on behalf of
	itself. 

	FQDN style can be used to get around a lack of a reverse map for
	initiators only.
    </t>
  </section>

  <section title="SG-A behind NAT/NAPT">
    <t>
       If there is a NAT or NAPT between SG-A and SG-B, then normal IPsec
       NAT traversal rules apply. In addition to the transport problem
       which may be solved by other mechanisms, there
       is the issue of what phase 1 and phase 2 IDs to use. While FQDN could
       be used during phase 1 for SG-A, there is no appropriate ID for phase 2
	that permits SG-B to determine that SG-A is in fact authorized to speak for Alice. 
    </t>
  </section>

  <section title="Bob is behind a NAT/NAPT">
    <t>
       If Bob is behind a NAT (perhaps SG-B), then there is, in fact, no way for
       Alice to address a packet to Bob. Not only is opportunistic encryption
       impossible, but it is also impossible for Alice to initiate any
       communication to Bob. It may be possible for Bob to initiate in such
       a situation. This creates an asymmetry, but this is common for 
       NAPT.
    </t>
  </section>
</section>

<section title="Host implementations">
<t>
  When Alice and SG-A are components of the same system, they are
  considered to be a host implementation. The packet sequence scenario remains unchanged.
</t>
<t>
  Components marked Alice are the upper layers (TCP, UDP, the
  application), and SG-A is the IP layer.
</t>
<t>
  Note that tunnel mode is still required. 
</t>
<t>
  As Alice and SG-A are acting on behalf of themselves, no TXT based delegation
  record is necessary for Alice to initiate. She can rely on FQDN in a
  forward map. This is particularly attractive to mobile nodes such as 
  notebook computers at conferences.
  To respond, Alice/SG-A will still need an entry in Alice's reverse map.
</t>
</section>

<section title="Multi-homing">
<t> 
If there are multiple paths between Alice and Bob (as illustrated in
the diagram with SG-D), then additional DNS records are required to establish
authorization. 
</t>
<t>
In <xref target="networkdiagram" />, Alice has two ways to
exit her network: SG-A and SG-D. Previously SG-D has been ignored. Postulate
that there are routers between Alice and her set of security gateways
(denoted by the + signs and the marking of an autonomous system number for
Alice's network). Datagrams may, therefore, travel to either SG-A or SG-D en
route to Bob.
</t>
<t>
As long as all network connections are in good order, it does not matter how
datagrams exit Alice's network. When they reach either security gateway, the
security gateway will find the TXT delegation record in Bob's reverse map,
and establish an SA with SG-B. 
</t>
<t>
SG-B has no problem establishing that either of SG-A or SG-D may speak for
Alice, because Alice has published two equally weighted TXT delegation records:
    <figure anchor="txtmultiexample"
    title="Multiple gateway delegation example for Alice">
           <artwork><![CDATA[
X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.1.1.5 AQMM...3s1Q==
X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.1.1.6 AAJN...j8r9==
          ]]></artwork>
    </figure>
</t>
<t>
Alice's routers can now do any kind of load sharing needed. Both SG-A and SG-D send datagrams addressed to Bob through
their tunnel to SG-B. 
</t>
<t>
Alice's use of non-equal weight delegation records to show preference of one gateway over another, has relevance only when SG-B 
is initiating to Alice. 
</t>
<t>
If the precedences are the same, then SG-B has a more difficult time. It
must decide which of the two tunnels to use. SG-B has no information about
which link is less loaded, nor which security gateway has more cryptographic
resources available. SG-B, in fact, has no knowledge of whether both gateways
are even reachable.  
</t>
<t>
The Public Internet's default-free zone may well know a good route to Alice,
but the datagrams that SG-B creates must be addressed to either SG-A or SG-D;
they can not be addressed to Alice directly.
</t>
<t>
SG-B may make a number of choices:
<list style="numbers">
<t>It can ignore the problem and round robin among the tunnels. This
      causes losses during times when one or the other security gateway is
      unreachable. If this worries Alice, she can change the weights in her
      TXT delegation records.</t>

<t>It can send to the gateway from which it most recently received datagrams. 
      This assumes that routing and reachability are symmetrical.</t>

<t>It can listen to BGP information from the Internet to decide which
      system is currently up. This is clearly much more complicated, but if SG-B is already participating
      in the BGP peering system to announce Bob, the results data may already
      be available to it. </t>

<t>It can refuse to negotiate the second tunnel. (It is unclear whether or
not this is even an option.)</t>

<t>It can silently replace the outgoing portion of the first tunnel with the
second one while still retaining the incoming portions of both. SG-B can,
thus, accept datagrams from either SG-A or SG-D, but
send only to the gateway that most recently re-keyed with it.</t> 
</list>
</t>

<t>
Local policy determines which choice SG-B makes. Note that even if SG-B has perfect
knowledge about the reachability of SG-A and SG-D, Alice may not be reachable
from either of these security gateways because of internal reachability
issues. 
</t>

<t>
FreeS/WAN implements option 5.  Implementing a different option is
being considered. The multi-homing aspects of OE are not well developed and may
be the subject of a future document.
</t>
	
</section>

<section title="Failure modes">
  <section title="DNS failures">
  <t>
  If a DNS server fails to respond, local policy decides
  whether or not to permit communication in the clear as embodied in
  the connection classes in <xref target="initclasses" />.
  It is easy to mount a denial of service attack on the DNS server
  responsible for a particular network's reverse map.
  Such an attack may cause all communication with that network to go in
  the clear if the policy is permissive, or fail completely 
  if the policy is paranoid. Please note that this is an active attack.
  </t>
  <t>
  There are still a very large number of networks
  that do not have properly configured reverse maps. Further, if the policy is not to communicate,
  the above denial of service attack isolates the target network. Therefore, the decision of whether 
or not to permit communication in the clear MUST be a matter of local policy.
  </t>
  </section>

  <section title="DNS configured, IKE failures">
  <t>
  DNS records claim that opportunistic encryption should
  occur, but the target gateway either does not respond on port 500, or
  refuses the proposal. This may be because of a crash or reboot, a
  faulty configuration, or a firewall filtering port 500.  
  </t>
  <t>
  The receipt of ICMP port, host or network unreachable
  messages indicating a potential problem, but MUST NOT cause communication to fail
  immediately. ICMP messages are easily forged by attackers. If such a
  forgery caused immediate failure, then an active attacker could easily prevent any
  encryption from ever occurring, possibly preventing all communication.
  </t>
  <t>
  In these situations a clear log should be produced
  and local policy should dictate if communication is then
  permitted in the clear.
  </t>
  </section>

  <section title="System reboots">
<t>
Tunnels sometimes go down because the remote end crashes,
disconnects, or has a network link break.  In general there is no
notification of this.  Even in the event of a crash and successful reboot, 
other SGs don't hear about it unless the rebooted SG has specific 
reason to talk to them immediately.  Over-quick response to temporary 
network outages is undesirable.  However, note that a tunnel can be torn
down and then re-established without any effect visible to the user
except a pause in traffic, but if one end reboots,
the other end can't get datagrams to it at all (except via
IKE) until the situation is noticed.  So a bias toward quick
response is appropriate even at the cost of occasional
false alarms.
</t>

<t>
A mechanism for recovery after reboot is a topic of current research and is not specified in this
document.
</t>

<t>
A deliberate shutdown should include an attempt, using deletes, to notify all other SGs
currently connected by phase 1 SAs that communication is
about to fail.  Again, a remote SG will assume this is a teardown.  Attempts by the
remote SGs to negotiate new tunnels as replacements should be ignored. When possible, 
SGs should attempt to preserve information about currently-connected SGs in non-volatile storage, so
that after a crash, an Initial-Contact can be sent to previous partners to
indicate loss of all previously established connections.
</t>

  </section>
</section>

<!--
<section title="Performance experiences">

    Claudia> Is it useful to point out (or to clarify for our own discussion) any of the
    Claudia> following:

    Claudia> *  how much time this is likely to take on typical current hardware?
    Claudia> *  what steps are likely to be time consuming
    Claudia> *  how any added time could affect a typical transaction, such as hitting 
    Claudia>    a web site
    Claudia> *  any ways to minimize such time delays

  <section title="Introduced latency">
  </section>

  <section title="Cryptographic performance">
  </section>

  <section title="Phase 1 SA performance">
  </section>

</section>
-->

<section title="Unresolved issues">
  <section title="Control of reverse DNS">
  <t>
  The method of obtaining information by reverse DNS lookup causes
  problems for people who cannot control their reverse DNS
  bindings. This is an unresolved problem in this version, and is out
  of scope.
  </t>
  </section>
</section>

<section title="Examples">

<section title="Clear-text usage (permit policy)">

<t>
Two example scenarios follow. In the first example GW-A
(Gateway A) and GW-B (Gateway B) have always-clear-text policies, and in the second example they have an OE
policy.
</t>

       <figure anchor="regulartiming" title="Timing of regular transaction">
           <artwork><![CDATA[
  Alice         SG-A       DNS       SG-B           Bob
   (1)
    ------(2)-------------->
    <-----(3)---------------
   (4)----(5)----->
                   ----------(6)------>
                                       ------(7)----->
                                      <------(8)------
                   <----------(9)------
    <----(10)-----
   (11)----------->
                   ----------(12)----->
                                       -------------->
                                      <---------------
                   <-------------------
    <-------------
          ]]></artwork>
</figure>

<t>
Alice wants to communicate with Bob. Perhaps she wants to retrieve a
web page from Bob's web server. In the absence of opportunistic
encryptors, the following events occur: 
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="(1)">Human or application 'clicks' with a name.</t>
<t hangText="(2)">Application looks up name in DNS to get IP address.</t>
<t hangText="(3)">Resolver returns A record to application.</t>
<t hangText="(4)">Application starts a TCP session or UDP session and OS sends datagram.</t>
<t hangText="(5)">Datagram is seen at first gateway from Alice (SG-A). (SG-A
makes a transition through Empty connection to always-clear connection and
instantiates a pass-through policy at the forwarding plane.)</t>
<t hangText="(6)">Datagram is seen at last gateway before Bob (SG-B).</t>
<t hangText="(7)">First datagram from Alice is seen by Bob.</t>
<t hangText="(8)">First return datagram is sent by Bob.</t>
<t hangText="(9)">Datagram is seen at Bob's gateway. (SG-B makes a transition through
Empty connection to always-clear connection and instantiates a pass-through
policy at the forwarding plane.)</t>
<t hangText="(10)">Datagram is seen at Alice's gateway.</t>
<t hangText="(11)">OS hands datagram to application. Alice sends another datagram.</t>
<t hangText="(12)">A second datagram traverses the Internet.</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>

<section title="Opportunistic encryption">

<t>
In the presence of properly configured opportunistic encryptors, the
event list is extended.

<figure anchor="opportunistictiming" title="Timing of opportunistic encryption transaction">
           <artwork><![CDATA[
  Alice          SG-A      DNS       SG-B           Bob
   (1)
    ------(2)-------------->
    <-----(3)---------------
   (4)----(5)----->+
                  ----(5B)->
                  <---(5C)--
                  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~(5D)~~~>
                  <~~~~~~~~~~~~(5E1)~~~
                  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~(5E2)~~>
                  <~~~~~~~~~~~~(5E3)~~~
                  #############(5E4)##>
                  <############(5E5)###
                           <----(5F1)--
                           -----(5F2)->
                  #############(5G1)##>
                           <----(5H1)--
                           -----(5H2)->
                  <############(5G2)###
                  #############(5G3)##>
                   ============(6)====>
		                       ------(7)----->
                                      <------(8)------
                  <==========(9)======
    <-----(10)----
   (11)----------->
                   ==========(12)=====>
                                       -------------->
                                      <---------------
                   <===================
    <-------------
          ]]></artwork>
</figure>

<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="(1)">Human or application clicks with a name.</t>
<t hangText="(2)">Application initiates DNS mapping.</t>
<t hangText="(3)">Resolver returns A record to application.</t>
<t hangText="(4)">Application starts a TCP session or UDP.</t>
<t hangText="(5)">SG-A (host or SG) sees datagram to target, and buffers it.</t>
<t hangText="(5B)">SG-A asks DNS for TXT record.</t>
<t hangText="(5C)">DNS returns TXT record(s).</t>
<t hangText="(5D)">Initial IKE Main Mode Packet goes out.</t>
<t hangText="(5E)">IKE ISAKMP phase 1 succeeds.</t>
<t hangText="(5F)">SG-B asks DNS for TXT record to prove SG-A is an agent for Alice.</t>
<t hangText="(5G)">IKE phase 2 negotiation.</t>
<t hangText="(5H)">DNS lookup by responder (SG-B).</t>
<t hangText="(6)">Buffered datagram is sent by SG-A.</t>
<t hangText="(7)">Datagram is received by SG-B, decrypted, and sent to Bob.</t>
<t hangText="(8)">Bob replies, and datagram is seen by SG-B.</t>
<t hangText="(9)">SG-B already has tunnel up with SG-A, and uses it.</t>
<t hangText="(10)">SG-A decrypts datagram and gives it to Alice.</t>
<t hangText="(11)">Alice receives datagram. Sends new packet to Bob.</t>
<t hangText="(12)">SG-A gets second datagram, sees that tunnel is up, and uses it.</t>
</list>
</t>

  <t>
  For the purposes of this section, we will describe only the changes that
  occur between <xref target="regulartiming" /> and
  <xref target="opportunistictiming" />. This corresponds to time points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 on the list above. 
  </t>

  <section title="(5) IPsec datagram interception">

    <t>
    At point (5), SG-A intercepts the datagram because this source/destination pair lacks a policy 
(the non-existent policy state). SG-A creates a hold policy, and buffers the datagram. SG-A requests keys from the keying daemon. 
    </t>

  </section>

  <section title="(5B) DNS lookup for TXT record">
    <t>
    SG-A's IKE daemon, having looked up the source/destination pair in the connection
    class list, creates a new Potential OE connection instance. SG-A starts DNS
    queries.
    </t>
  </section>

  <section title="(5C) DNS returns TXT record(s)">

  <t>
  DNS returns properly formed TXT delegation records, and SG-A's IKE daemon
  causes this instance to make a transition from Potential OE connection to Pending OE
  connection.
  </t>

    <t>
      Using the example above, the returned record might contain:

    <figure anchor="txtexample"
    title="Example of reverse delegation record for Bob">
           <artwork><![CDATA[
X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.1.1.5 AQMM...3s1Q==
          ]]></artwork>
    </figure>
    with SG-B's IP address and public key listed.
    </t>

  </section>

  <section title="(5D) Initial IKE main mode packet goes out">
  <t>Upon entering Pending OE connection, SG-A sends the initial ISAKMP
  message with proposals. See <xref target="phase1id" />.
  </t>
  </section>

  <section title="(5E1) Message 2 of phase 1 exchange">
  <t>
  SG-B receives the message. A new connection instance is created in the
  unauthenticated OE peer state.
  </t>
  </section>

  <section title="(5E2) Message 3 of phase 1 exchange">
  <t>
  SG-A sends a Diffie-Hellman exponent. This is an internal state of the
  keying daemon.
  </t>
  </section>

  <section title="(5E3) Message 4 of phase 1 exchange">
  <t>
  SG-B responds with a Diffie-Hellman exponent. This is an internal state of the
  keying protocol.
  </t>
  </section>

  <section title="(5E4) Message 5 of phase 1 exchange">
  <t>
  SG-A uses the phase 1 SA to send its identity under encryption. 
  The choice of identity is discussed in <xref target="phase1id" />.
  This is an internal state of the keying protocol.
  </t>
  </section>

  <section title="(5F1) Responder lookup of initiator key">
  <t>
  SG-B asks DNS for the public key of the initiator. 
  DNS looks for a KEY record by IP address in the reverse map.
  That is, a KEY resource record is queried for 4.1.1.192.in-addr.arpa
  (recall that SG-A's external address is 192.1.1.4).
  SG-B uses the resulting public key to authenticate the initiator. See <xref
  target="KEY" /> for further details. 
  </t>
  </section>

<section title="(5F2) DNS replies with public key of initiator">
<t>
Upon successfully authenticating the peer, the connection instance makes a
transition to authenticated OE peer on SG-B.
</t>
<t>
The format of the TXT record returned is described in
<xref target="TXT" />. 
</t>
</section>

  <section title="(5E5) Responder replies with ID and authentication">
  <t>
    SG-B sends its ID along with authentication material. This is an internal
    state for the keying protocol.
  </t>
  </section>

  <section title="(5G) IKE phase 2">
    <section title="(5G1) Initiator proposes tunnel">
    <t>
    Having established mutually agreeable authentications (via KEY) and
    authorizations (via TXT), SG-A proposes to create an IPsec tunnel for
    datagrams transiting from Alice to Bob. This tunnel is established only for 
    the Alice/Bob combination, not for any subnets that may be behind SG-A and SG-B.
    </t>
    </section>

    <section title="(5H1) Responder determines initiator's authority">
    <t>
    While the identity of SG-A has been established, its authority to
    speak for Alice has not yet been confirmed. SG-B does a reverse
    lookup on Alice's address for a TXT record. 
    </t>
    <t>Upon receiving this specific proposal, SG-B's connection instance
    makes a transition into the potential OE connection state. SG-B may already have an
    instance, and the check is made as described above.</t>
    </section>
  
    <section title="(5H2) DNS replies with TXT record(s)">
    <t>
      The returned key and IP address should match that of SG-A.
    </t>	
    </section>
    
    <section title="(5G2) Responder agrees to proposal">
    <t>
    Should additional communication occur between, for instance, Dave and Bob using
    SG-A and SG-B, a new tunnel (phase 2 SA) would be established. The phase 1 SA
    may be reusable.
    </t>
    <t>SG-A, having successfully keyed the tunnel, now makes a transition from
    Pending OE connection to Keyed OE connection.
    </t>
    <t>The responder MUST setup the inbound IPsec SAs before sending its reply.</t>
    </section>

    <section title="(5G3) Final acknowledgment from initiator">
    <t>
    The initiator agrees with the responder's choice and sets up the tunnel.
    The initiator sets up the inbound and outbound IPsec SAs.
    </t>
    <t>
    The proper authorization returned with keys prompts SG-B to make a transition
    to the keyed OE connection state. 
    </t>
    <t>Upon receipt of this message, the responder may now setup the outbound
    IPsec SAs</t> 
    </section>
  </section>

  <section title="(6) IPsec succeeds, and sets up tunnel for communication between Alice and Bob">
  <t>
  SG-A sends the datagram saved at step (5) through the newly created
  tunnel to SG-B, where it gets decrypted and forwarded. 
  Bob receives it at (7) and replies at (8). 
  </t>
  </section>

  <section title="(9) SG-B already has tunnel up with G1 and uses it">
  <t>
  At (9), SG-B has already established an SPD entry mapping Bob->Alice via a
  tunnel, so this tunnel is simply applied. The datagram is encrypted to SG-A,
  decrypted by SG-A and passed to Alice at (10).
  </t>

  </section>
</section> <!-- OE example -->

</section> <!-- Examples -->

<section anchor="securityconsiderations" title="Security considerations">

  <section title="Configured vs opportunistic tunnels">
<t>
    Configured tunnels are those which are setup using bilateral mechanisms: exchanging 
public keys (raw RSA, DSA, PKIX), pre-shared secrets, or by referencing keys that
are in known places (distinguished name from LDAP, DNS). These keys are then used to
configure a specific tunnel. 
</t>
<t>
A pre-configured tunnel may be on all the time, or may be keyed only when needed. 
The end points of the tunnel are not necessarily static: many mobile
applications (road warrior) are considered to be configured tunnels. 
</t>
<t>
The primary characteristic is that configured tunnels are assigned specific
security properties. They may be trusted in different ways relating to exceptions to 
firewall rules, exceptions to NAT processing, and to bandwidth or other quality of service restrictions. 
</t>
<t>
Opportunistic tunnels are not inherently trusted in any strong way. They are
created without prior arrangement. As the two parties are strangers, there
MUST be no confusion of datagrams that arrive from opportunistic peers and
those that arrive from configured tunnels. A security gateway MUST take care
that an opportunistic peer can not impersonate a configured peer.
</t>
<t>
Ingress filtering MUST be used to make sure that only datagrams authorized by
negotiation (and the concomitant authentication and authorization) are
accepted from a tunnel. This is to prevent one peer from impersonating another. 
</t>
<t>
An implementation suggestion is to treat opportunistic tunnel
datagrams as if they arrive on a logical interface distinct from other
configured tunnels. As the number of opportunistic tunnels that may be
created automatically on a system is potentially very high, careful attention 
to scaling should be taken into account.
</t>
<t>
As with any IKE negotiation, opportunistic encryption cannot be secure
without authentication. Opportunistic encryption relies on DNS for its
authentication information and, therefore, cannot be fully secure without
a secure DNS. Without secure DNS, opportunistic encryption can protect against passive
eavesdropping but not against active man-in-the-middle attacks.
</t>
  </section>

  <section title="Firewalls vs Opportunistic Tunnels">
<t>
  Typical usage of per datagram access control lists is to implement various
kinds of security gateways. These are typically called "firewalls". 
</t>
<t>
  Typical usage of a virtual private network (VPN) within a firewall is to
bypass all or part of the access controls between two networks. Additional
trust (as outlined in the previous section) is given to datagrams that arrive
in the VPN.
</t>
<t> 
  Datagrams that arrive via opportunistically configured tunnels MUST not be
trusted. Any security policy that would apply to a datagram arriving in the
clear SHOULD also be applied to datagrams arriving opportunistically.
</t>
  </section>

  <section title="Denial of service">
<t>
  There are several different forms of denial of service that an implementor 
  should concern themselves with. Most of these problems are shared with
  security gateways that have large numbers of mobile peers (road warriors). 
</t>
<t>
  The design of ISAKMP/IKE, and its use of cookies, defend against many kinds
  of denial of service. Opportunism changes the assumption that if the phase 1 (ISAKMP) 
  SA is authenticated, that it was worthwhile creating. Because the gateway will communicate with any machine, it is
  possible to form phase 1 SAs with any machine on the Internet. 
</t>

</section>
</section>

<section title="IANA Considerations">
<t>
    There are no known numbers which IANA will need to manage.
</t>
</section>

<section title="Acknowledgments">
<t>
        Substantive portions of this document are based upon previous work by
        Henry Spencer.
</t>
<t>
	Thanks to Tero Kivinen, Sandy Harris, Wes Hardarker, Robert Moskowitz,
	Jakob Schlyter, Bill Sommerfeld, John Gilmore and John Denker for their
	comments and constructive criticism.
</t>
<t>
	Sandra Hoffman and Bill Dickie did the detailed proof reading and editing.
</t>
</section>

</middle>

<back>
<references title="Normative references">
<?rfc include="reference.OEspec" ?>
<!-- renumber according to reference order -->
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.0791" ?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.1009" ?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.1984" ?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2119" ?>
<!-- IPsec -->
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2367" ?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2401" ?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2407" ?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2408" ?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2409" ?>
<!-- MODPGROUPS -->
<?rfc include="reference.MODPGROUPS" ?>
<!-- DNSSEC -->
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.1034" ?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.1035" ?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2671" ?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.1464" ?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2535" ?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.3110" ?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2538" ?>
<!-- COPS -->
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2748" ?>
<!-- NAT -->
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2663" ?>
</references>
<!-- <references title="Non-normative references"> -->
<!-- ESPUDP -->
<!-- <?rfc include="reference.ESPUDP" ?> -->
<!-- </references> -->
</back>
</rfc>
<!--
  $Id: draft-richardson-ipsec-opportunistic.xml,v 1.28 2002/07/25 19:27:31 mcr Exp $

  $Log: draft-richardson-ipsec-opportunistic.xml,v $
  Revision 1.28  2002/07/25 19:27:31  mcr
  	added DHR's minor edits.

  Revision 1.27  2002/07/21 16:26:26  mcr
  	slides from presentation at OLS
  	draft-10 of OE draft.

  Revision 1.26  2002/07/16 03:46:53  mcr
  	second edits from Sandra.

  Revision 1.25  2002/07/16 03:36:14  mcr
  	removed HS from authors list
  	updated reference inclusion to use <?rfc-include directive.
  Revision 1.24  2002/07/11 02:08:21  mcr
  	updated XML file from Sandra

  Revision 1.23  2002/06/06 17:18:53  mcr
  	spellcheck.

  Revision 1.22  2002/06/06 17:14:19  mcr
  	results of hand-editing session from May 28th.
  	This is FINAL OE draft.

  Revision 1.21  2002/06/06 02:25:44  mcr
  	results of hand-editing session from May 28th.
  	This is FINAL OE draft.

  Revision 1.20  2002/05/24 03:28:37  mcr
  	changes as requested by RFC editor.

  Revision 1.19  2002/04/09 16:01:05  mcr
  	comments from PHB.

  Revision 1.18  2002/04/08 02:14:34  mcr
  	RGBs changes to rev6.

  Revision 1.17  2002/03/12 21:23:55  mcr
  	adjusted definition of default-free zone.
  	moved text on key rollover from format description to new
  	section.

  Revision 1.16  2002/02/22 01:23:21  mcr
  	revisions from MCR (2002/2/18) and net.

  Revision 1.15  2002/02/21 20:44:12  mcr
  	extensive from DHR.

  Revision 1.14  2002/02/10 16:20:39  mcr
  	-05 draft. Many revisions to do "OE system in world of OE systems"
  	view of the universe.

  Revision 1.13  2001/12/20 04:35:22  mcr
  	fixed reference to rfc1984.

  Revision 1.12  2001/12/20 03:35:19  mcr
  	comments from Henry, Tero, and Sandy.

  Revision 1.11  2001/12/19 07:26:22  mcr
  	added comment about KX records.

  Revision 1.10  2001/11/09 04:28:10  mcr
  	fixed some typos with XML, and one s/SG-B/SG-D/.

  Revision 1.9  2001/11/09 04:07:13  mcr
  	expanded section 10: multihoming, with an example.

  Revision 1.8  2001/11/09 02:16:51  mcr
  	added lifetime/lifespan definitions.
  	moved example from 5B to 5C.
  	added reference to phase 1 IDs to 5D.
  	cleared up text in aging section.
  	added text about delegation of DNSSEC activity to a DNS server.
  	spelt out DH group names.
  	added text about ignoring TXT records unless DNSSEC is deployed (somerfeld)
  	added example of TXT delegation using FQDN.
  	clarified some text in NAT interaction section.
  	clarified absense of TXT record need for host implementation

  Revision 1.7  2001/11/08 23:09:37  mcr
  	changed revision of draft to 03.

  Revision 1.6  2001/11/08 19:37:14  mcr
  	fixed some formatting of Aging section.

  Revision 1.5  2001/11/08 19:19:30  mcr
  	fixed address for DHR, updated address for MCR,
  	added reference to original HS/DHR OE specification paper.

  Revision 1.4  2001/11/08 19:08:24  mcr
  	section 10, "Renewal and Teardown" added moved between 4/5, and
  	slightly rewritten.

  Revision 1.3  2001/11/08 18:56:34  mcr
  	sections 4.2, 5.6, 5.7.1 and 6.2 edited as per HS.
  	section 10, "Renewal and Teardown" added.
  	section 11, "Failure modes" completed.

  Revision 1.2  2001/11/05 20:31:31  mcr
  	added section from OE spec on aging and teardown.

  Revision 1.1  2001/11/05 04:27:58  mcr
  	OE draft added to documentation.

  Revision 1.12  2001/10/10 01:12:31  mcr
  	removed impact on DNS servers section.
  	removed nested comments.
  	adjusted data of issue

  Revision 1.11  2001/09/17 02:55:50  mcr
  	outline is now stable.

  Revision 1.5  2001/08/19 02:53:32  mcr
  	version 00d formatted.

  Revision 1.10  2001/08/19 02:34:04  mcr
  	version 00d formatted.

  Revision 1.9  2001/08/19 02:21:54  mcr
  	version 00d

  Revision 1.8  2001/07/20 19:07:06  mcr
    commented out section 1.1

  Revision 1.7  2001/07/20 14:14:22  mcr
  	HS and HD comments.

  Revision 1.6  2001/07/19 00:56:50  mcr
  	version 00b.

  Revision 1.5  2001/07/12 23:57:07  mcr
  	OE ID, 00.


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